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Abstract
Several studies have sought to explain the politicization of European Union’s (EU) trade policy during negotiations on
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement be-
tween the EU and Canada (CETA). This article contributes to the literature on the politicization of trade by assessing how
politicization is addressed by those tasked with the content and implementation of trade policy, namely the European
Commission (hereafter Commission). We identify the origin and definition of managed globalization (MG), and thereafter
identify, through a qualitative content analysis of EU Trade Commissioners’ speeches from 2013 to late 2017, how the
doctrine re-emerged as the leitmotif of EU trade policy. The Commission’s initial response to civil society organizations’
contestation over TTIP and CETA was to insist on the economic benefits of the agreements. As contestation intensified,
we find indirect references to MG, as the Commission focused on clarifying that upholding European values was equally
important to market access in EU trade policy. Then, from late 2016 until late 2017, the Commission’s messaging was di-
rected primarily at populist fears of trade and globalization; emphasizing that protectionism was unnecessary, and that
globalization could be controlled, culminating in the emergence of explicit references to MG. The article expands on exist-
ing research on MG by identifying trade politicization as a factor that prompted a modification and expansion of the MG
doctrine and its use, while also discussing some accompanying policy changes.
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1. Introduction
Several studies have sought to explain the politiciza-
tion of European Union’s (EU) trade policy during ne-
gotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) between the US and the EU, and
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA) between the EU and Canada (e.g., Laursen
& Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Young, 2018), as well as
the European Commission’s (hereafter Commission) re-
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sponse (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019; Siles-Brügge,
2018; Young, 2019). This article contributes to these ef-
forts, butmore importantly, it focuses on the larger ques-
tion of the politicization of trade by arguing that the
Commission’s response to mobilization against TTIP and
CETA was neither completely new, nor specific to these
agreements, but rather a modification and expansion of
a previously applied doctrine. This matters because the
trade doctrine adopted by the Commission is today in-
tended to not only quell, but also incorporate, expressed
concerns about the expansion of new issues in trade ne-
gotiations; it is also used to address rising populism and
concerns about globalization.
In this article we argue that the EU responded to in-
creased politicization by invoking, modifying, and adopt-
ing a doctrine originating in 1999.Managed globalization
(MG) initially emerged in 1999, in a different context, and
was applied by the Commission for some years there-
after. We tap into the literature about that period to de-
fineMG, and then explore the EU’smessaging during and
after TTIP negotiations (although negotiations on CETA
beganprior to TTIP negotiations, CETAwas not politicized
until linked with TTIP).
We show that the Commission’s rhetorical response
to the most politicized trade negotiations in EU history
(on TTIP) was incremental, with three distinct phases,
leading to an invocation and solidification of a mod-
ified MG as the Commission responded to contested
trade policies, rising populism, and fears of globalization.
Explicit references to a modified MG emerged just as
the TTIP negotiations were frozen, indicating that the
Commission deemed it a useful way of signaling a per-
manent shift in trade policy. In this context an explana-
tory note is appropriate: A doctrine is a belief system that
may guide policy; a policy is the principles and the rules
adopted by an organization; a strategy is a way of convey-
ing and implementing a policy.
The next section presents politicization and respon-
siveness, and justifies our argument on theoretical
grounds, while section three explains the methodol-
ogy. The analysis is presented in sections four and five.
Section six concludes.
2. Rhetorical Responses to Politicization and the
Managed Globalization Doctrine
The objective of this article is to improve our understand-
ing of the Commission’s response to politicization over
TTIP and CETA. We argue that: 1) the Commission’s re-
sponse was part of a rhetorical counter-strategy, and
2) that the response was grounded in the MG doctrine
introduced by Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy in 1999.
Our study contributes to the literature on the evolu-
tion of the EU’s trade policy pertaining to both values
and market access (Drieghe & Potjomkina, 2019). Our
research also complements, and partly challenges, the
analysis carried out by Young (2019), who, when com-
paring the EU’s 2010 and 2015–2017 trade strategies, ar-
gues that the Commission “over-generalized from an ex-
treme case” and pursued a policy “characterized more
by continuity than by change” (p. 3). While we do not as-
sesswhether the Commission’s response to politicization
was sufficient to permanently address civil society’s con-
cerns over trade (cf. Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019), we
take a slightly longer historical perspective, which further
enhances our understanding of how the Commission re-
sponded to trade politicization in the context of TTIP ne-
gotiations and their aftermath.
An analysis of the Commission’s response is also rel-
evant to the literature on the politicization of EU integra-
tion. For some, the politicization of European integration
spells the end of the permissive consensus and the be-
ginning of an era of “constraining dissensus” (Hooghe &
Marks, 2009), while others (Beck, 2013; Hix, 2006) see
politicization as a democratic necessity and a precondi-
tion for the legitimacy of further European integration.
Our case study provides insights on how the targets of
politicization deal with the challenging relationship be-
tween politicization and legitimacy.
2.1. Politicization and Responsiveness
The literature shows that politicization includes rhetor-
ical strategies, and that it is a cause of change in inter-
national institutions and the EU. Drawing on the defini-
tions outlined by deWilde (2011) and Gheyle (2019), we
define trade politicization as an increase in the salience
of trade negotiations, institutions, and rules, a rise in
the number and type of actors mobilizing and participat-
ing in debates on trade policy, and the polarization of
their opinions.
From the time the negotiations on TTIP were an-
nounced, there was a steadily rising chorus emanating
from civil society organizations (CSOs) arguing that the
agreement threatened to undermine EU standards and
safety regulations, as well as governments’ abilities to
regulate in the public interest (De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2016; Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2017). CSOs, some labor
unions, and a fewpolitical parties, sought to convince the
public that TTIP would harm product safety, public poli-
cies, and democracy (see also van Loon, 2020, in this the-
matic issue). Opposition emerged across Europe, though
concentrated in the western half of the European conti-
nent and the UK. Many groups staged their own events,
but many also learned from, and most coordinated with,
others, sometimes under the pan-European heading
StopTTIP! (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019; Young, 2017).
CSOs largely refrained fromattempting to undermine
proponents’ claims of the economic and geopolitical ben-
efits of TTIP, choosing instead to focus on the fear of
losing precious European achievements, such as high
food and safety standards, and the welfare state. TTIP
was presented as a trade-off between neo-liberalism
(or “wild-west capitalism”) and “popular sovereignty”
(Friends of the Earth Europe, 2016; cf. IG Metal, 2014).
CSOs framed Investor State Dispute-Settlement (ISDS)—
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a long-established practice intended to ensure that for-
eign investors have access to a de-politicized legal pro-
cess to pursue compensation, but not legislative changes,
through third-party arbitration when a host country’s
government violates the terms of an investment treaty—
in TTIP as a carte blanche for US corporations to sue
European governments over any public policy that could
reduce corporate profits, such as new environmental
or public health laws. Both taxpayers and public poli-
cies would therefore be ‘on the hook’ of US compa-
nies’ actions (Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019, pp. 61–68).
Transparency (or rather, the lack of) was another issue
chosen to signal the detrimental effects of TTIP; the ar-
gument being that nothing negotiated by representa-
tives behind closed doors can produce a good agreement
(De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016; Gheyle & De Ville, 2017).
CSOs consistently paired big business or corporations
with something negative, implying that the Commission
was unable to withstand US pressure, thus jeopardizing
European standards (e.g., Seattle to Brussels Network,
2015). TTIP was portrayed by the Corporate Europe
Observatory as a losing proposition for Europeans, a “ve-
hicle to facilitate deregulation” threatening each side’s
democratic right to regulate “even when doing so re-
sults in divergent standards that businesses may find
inconvenient” (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2013a).
TTIP would “open the floodgate to GMOs [genetically
modified organisms]” and “TTIP will lower regulations
on food safety…and will lead to more industrialized, in-
tensive food production that undermines the health of
people and the planet. Trade policy should be for the
benefit of people and the environment, not corpora-
tions” (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2013b, p. 1, 2014,
p. 8). The message sent throughout 2013–2016 was that
TTIP meant sacrificing European values and standards
(cf. Buonanno, 2017; Young, 2017).
Zürn (2014) argues there is a sizeable degree of re-
sponsiveness by international institutions to politiciza-
tion, thuswe should expect the EU to respond to this fear-
grounded rhetorical strategy with some form of counter-
rhetoric. The EU is considered a “hothouse” for participa-
tion of different types of actors (Peterson, 1995, p. 69),
and we expect this to strengthen the effect of politiciza-
tion on the incentive structure of policy-makers, making
them more responsive. De Bruycker (2019, p. 1) using a
panel data analysis on EU responsiveness finds that “un-
der politicized conditions, the adoption of EU policy de-
cisions is preceded by increased public support and fol-
lowed by decreased public support for EU policy change.”
This indicates that, in the face of politicization, decision-
makers adjust policy to social demands (policy respon-
siveness), after which the public again adjusts their de-
mands in light of those policy changes (public respon-
siveness; Zürn, 2014, pp. 59–60). Such changes can be
fostered by accountability mechanisms, including close
scrutiny by voters and elected officials; again, given the
EU’s structure,we should expect it to bemore responsive
to politicization than (other) international institutions.
2.2. Managed Globalization and Politicization
CSOs contested trade and globalization in late 1999 and
early 2000, before, during, and after the World Trade
Organization’s (WTO) ministerial meeting in Seattle (the
“Battle of Seattle,” e.g., Scholte, 2000). As Abdelal and
Meunier (2010, p. 355) argue, “the anti-globalization
movement was gaining traction in public opinion with
its widely publicized successes at the WTO conference in
Seattle in 1999 and later at the World Social Forum.” As
a result, “other European countries embraced the French
vision that globalization ought to be accompanied by new
regulations and flanked by policies to soften its impact”
(Abdelal&Meunier, 2010). Theprotestswere at that time
directed primarily at the WTO rather than the EU, but as
a major player (along with the US, Japan, and Canada) it
provoked a significant response by the Commission.
Pascal Lamy, Trade Commissioner from 1999 to 2004,
introduced the term MG in his hearing at the European
Parliament in September 1999, and was subsequently
able to make it “the guiding doctrine of EU trade pol-
icy” (Meunier, 2007, p. 910). The adoption of MG also
served to calm internal tensions about EU trade pol-
icy between those advocating trade liberalization and
those concerned with the preservation of public stan-
dards, including demands for trade protection (Meunier
& Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 921). Existing European prefer-
ences on food safety, cultural diversity, public provision
of education and health care, or welfare rights, could—
it was argued—legitimate protection against foreign en-
trants, and “such a philosophy [of protection]…might be
the ultimate condition for sustaining public support for
an overall strategy of relatively open-access to EU mar-
kets” (Meunier & Nicolaïdis, 2006, p. 922). However, af-
ter 2004, MG ceased appearing in speeches and strat-
egy papers, and was “replaced in 2006 by shorter-
term, more trade-centred and mercantilist objectives”
(Meunier, 2007, p. 906). The primary goal of EU trade pol-
icy was no longer the “more remote goal of managing
globalization” but instead “creating markets abroad for
European companies” (Meunier, 2007, p. 916).While still
affirming the primacy of multilateralism, the EU’s aban-
doned itsmoratoriumon bilateral trade agreements, and
the stated priority was no longer to balance openness
with rules, but rather to ensure market access.
3. Managed Globalization as a Response
to Politicization
We analyze the Commission’s rhetoric on TTIP, CETA,
and trade policy in general from 2013 to 2017. This
section presents the methodology, while justifying the
choices made.
3.1. The Commission’s Rhetorical Response
We analyze the Commission’s communication on TTIP
and CETA negotiations in particular, and on EU trade pol-
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icy in general, from around the time TTIP negotiations
were announced in January 2013 until September 2017.
The analysis covers 79 speeches (European Commission,
2012–2016, 2016–2017; see the Supplementary File for a
list of all speeches, in this article they are referenced only
by “European Commission,month day, year”), represent-
ing more than 50% of speeches between January 2013
andOctober 2016, and all 22 speeches on EU trade policy
between November 2016 and September 2017. We end
in September in 2017 because it was one year after TTIP
negotiations ended—providing sufficient time to cap-
ture any changes in rhetorical strategy vis-à-vis ongoing
negotiations, aswell as the rise in the populist backlashes
against trade and globalization. The Commission also
published its first report on the implementation of the
2015 trade strategy, Trade for All (European Commission,
2015), that month. Thus, we should be able to ascertain
whether the MG doctrine had taken hold by fall of 2017.
We chose to analyze speeches made by the Trade
Commissioner because the Commission oversees all
trade negotiations, and the Trade Commissioner is the
official representative of and spokesperson on EU trade.
What the Commissioner says should reflect where the
Commission stands and what it will do on trade. We
do not distinguish between Trade Commissioners (Karel
De Gucht was Trade Commissioner in 2013 and for
most of 2014, while Cecilia Malmström assumed office
in November 2014) because the objective is to assess
the Commission’s response rather than the impact of
each Commissioner.
We carry out the analysis using qualitative content
analysis. This method was chosen because it identifies
key discursive elements through a deductive rather than
inductive procedure, while adopting an interpretative fo-
cus on framing and changes in discourse (Kohlbacher,
2006). To analyze the framing and changes in dis-
course we draw on Hirschman (1991) and Brink (2009).
These scholars identify different rhetorical strategies.
Hirschman (1991) distinguishes between three types of
rhetorical responses, or “rhetoric of reaction” used by
opponents of a proposed change or reform. The “perver-
sity thesis” assumes that a proposal would only “serve
to exacerbate the condition onewishes to remedy” (p. 7)
because there will be unintended consequences or side-
effects due to imperfect foresight. The “futility thesis”
holds that attempts at social transformation would fail
to change society because the basic structures of soci-
ety are unchangeable; “human actions pursuing a given
aim are nullified” (p. 72). Finally, the “jeopardy thesis ar-
gues that the cost of the proposed change or reform is
too high as it endangers some previous, precious accom-
plishment” (p. 7); while the proposed change may be de-
sirable in itself, it involves unacceptable costs (p. 81).
When opponents use a thesis based on a fear of los-
ing benefits inherent in the status quo, as in the case
over TTIP (a “jeopardy thesis”), recipients may resort to
three types of rhetorical responses: intransigent, democ-
racy friendly, and functional; the second and third type
of messaging being more conciliatory than the first. The
“intransigent” rhetoric includes “mutual support” (which
is positivemessaging; actions will generate benefits with-
out jeopardizing the status quo), and “dangers of in-
action” (negative messaging; inaction results in harm).
“Democracy friendly” rhetoric entails conciliation, mov-
ing beyond intransigent postures, and engaging in de-
liberation. This represents a “mature” approach, where
the risks of both action and inaction are “canvassed,
assessed, and guarded against to the extent possible,”
and where uncertainty is recognized (Hirschman, 1991,
p. 153). A “functional” rhetorical approach (Brink, 2009)
is when supporters or advocates use the language and
standpoints of opponents, but without changing policy
preferences. Such a response differs from a democrat-
ically friendly one, in that rather than conveying a will-
ingness to change the policy or negotiating position, sup-
porters would continue claiming the same or a similar
position, but apply language used by opponents. In the
TTIP casewhere opponents positioned themselves as the
protectors of European values (exigent standards) and
democracy (public policies), a functional response would
be to accept and state that values and democracy should
be at the forefront of EU trade policy.
Thus, we differentiate between intransigent positive
messaging (e.g., TTIP will improve status quo), intran-
sigent negative messaging (e.g., status quo in danger
without TTIP), conciliatory messaging (e.g., TTIP’s costs
should be considered) and functional messaging (e.g.,
European values and democracy are more important
than material or geopolitical benefits), which we iden-
tify in the qualitative content analysis. Due to oppo-
nents’ focus on the need to protect EU values, the more
functional or democratically friendly the messaging, the
more likely the invocation of the MG doctrine. We find
that the Commission was consistently conciliatory re-
garding ISDS, while its rhetoric on the other issues of con-
tention (economic and geopolitical benefits, and EU stan-
dards) shifted from mainly intransigent (through both
positive and negative messaging), to increasingly func-
tional rhetoric.
3.2. Operationalizing the Managed Globalization
Doctrine
To assess whether there is evidence of the MG doc-
trine in the Trade Commissioner’s speeches from 2013 to
November 2017, we need to operationalize the MG doc-
trine. To do so, we draw on the work of Meunier (2007)
and Jacoby and Meunier (2010).
According to Meunier (2007, p. 906), MG refers to
an encompassing doctrine that subordinates trade policy
to a variety of non-trade objectives, such as multilateral-
ism, social justice, and sustainable development. As such,
MG means “going beyond the simple removal of regula-
tions andmaking some effort to shape and regularize the
competitive order,” thus establishing “rule-based glob-
alization” (Meunier, 2007, pp. 303–304), which “shows
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the voters that politicians are firmly in control” (p. 301).
Jacoby andMeunier (2010, p. 302–303) add that this doc-
trine is placed between the extremes of protectionism
and complete laissez-faire (“ad hoc globalization”), thus
implying an effort to both tame and harness globaliza-
tion. The Commission’s rhetorical compatibility with MG
is also assessed by comparing it against the five charac-
teristics of MG outlined by Meunier (2007). In practical
terms, Meunier argues, MG means building a set of con-
straining trading rules, promotingmultilateralism,widen-
ing the definition of trade issues subject to rule-making,
exporting the EU model, and redistributing the benefits
and costs of globalization.
In the following sections we first look for messages
regarding the objectives of EU trade policy in the Trade
Commissioner’s speeches, focusing on themessages’ po-
sitioning on the laissez-faire/protectionism continuum,
and the strategy employed by the Commission. The MG
doctrine is not present if the objective is at one of the
extremes; either pure market access or no trade agree-
ment. If values are placed at least on the same level
as economic interests, we accept that the MG doctrine
is being used by the Commission. We find that while
the Commission only explicitly began referring to MG af-
ter the freezing of TTIP negotiations in late 2016, MG
had already implicitly returned as a guiding principle for
trade policy in 2015, manifest in Trade for All (European
Commission, 2015). Section five goes further, examining
the Commission’s approach andmessaging in regards the
five aforementioned characteristics of MG. We find that
while the Commission proposed a trade policy consistent
with these characteristics, the promotion of multilateral-
ism is implicit, through bilateralism, and there is a new
preoccupation with trade defense instruments.
4. The Directorate General for Trade’s Response to
Politicization from 2013 to 2017
The Commission’s initial messaging—when contestation
began—was devoid of any references to MG. The fo-
cus was on economic benefits (i.e., on market ac-
cess). Thereafter, as contestation intensified in late 2014
and evolved into the politicization of trade policy, the
Commission used language more consistent with MG.
The focus shifted to countering CSOs’ fears that TTIP en-
dangered European values.We find that the Commission
only explicitly began referring to MG after the freezing
of TTIP negotiations in late 2016, and then mainly when
countering demands for protectionism (fear of globaliza-
tion) by populist parties, but that MG had already implic-
itly returned as a guiding principle for tradepolicy in 2015.
This shift towards the MG doctrine is consistent with the
evolution in the type of rhetoric used by the Commission.
As summed up in Table 1, the use of MG language coin-
cides with an increasing use of functional messaging.
4.1. 2013–2014: A Focus on Economic Benefits
TTIP was promoted as bringing economic benefits and
providing economic growth, thanks to ‘scale’ (the size
of the partners’ commercial relationship would create
a multiplier effect for all new liberalization), integration
(extensive economic interpenetration means better inte-
grated value chains), confidence (companies would be
able to plan for the future), and because the costs of
inaction (to the status quo) would be high (Eliasson &
Garcia-Duran, 2019, p. 83). In 2013, prospective eco-
nomic benefits were quantified, aswere TTIP’s impact on
third countries (European Commission, March 2, 2013).
In 2014, the Commission presented specific examples of
economic benefits, and began emphasizing how small
and medium enterprises were going to benefit (e.g.,
European Commission, May 22, 2014).
The Commission also progressively enlarged the
number of arguments it used to promote TTIP in the
face of CSOs’ claims that the agreement would rad-
ically change the status quo for European standards
and democracy. Countering opponents’ arguments, the
Commission maintained that the status quo was not an
option, because both partners were simultaneously ne-
gotiating and signing other bilateral trade agreements
(EuropeanCommission, December 5, 2012). If theUS and
the EU were unable to reach agreement on regulatory
convergence, then “others” would exercise leadership in
regulatory matters (European Commission, October 10,
2013, p. 6). Moreover, regulatory convergence would
not lead to a race to the bottom because “the world’s
most advanced, most revolutionary, experiment in reg-
ulatory cooperation”—the European Single Market—
showed that “there doesn’t need to be a trade-off be-
tween high standards and open markets” (European
Commission, October 10, 2013, p. 3). In 2014, TTIP was
said to allow the EU to shape world norms because “if
wewant to continue to shape the norms, rules, standards
and disciplines that are so important in a globalized econ-
omy, we have to realise that we cannot do this without
partners” (European Commission, May 22, 2014, p. 4).
The Commission was more conciliatory regarding
ISDS. This issue only started appearing in speeches
around the same time as the Commission’s commitment
Table 1. Type of messaging and consistency with MG.
Period Language consistent with MG Type of messaging
2013–2014 No Mainly intransigent
2015–2016 Yes, implicitly Shift towards functional
2016–2017 Yes, explicitly Mainly functional
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to making the negotiation “as transparent and open
to public scrutiny as possible” (European Commission,
April 10, 2014, p. 5). The purpose of a public consulta-
tion launched by the Commission in 2104 was “to cre-
ate a new, improved type of investment agreement”
(European Commission, April 10, 2014, p. 4). In May
2014, while clearly supporting the need for investment
protection in TTIP, the Commission accepted “that there
is room for debate, interpretation or improvement”
(European Commission, May 22, 2014, p. 2) and empha-
sized that “it is our chance to set amodel for future agree-
ments all around the world” (p. 3).
As protests by CSOs intensified, the messaging—
while still mainly intransigent and focused on the eco-
nomic benefits of TTIP—shifted from promoting TTIP’s
benefits for growth and jobs to consumer benefits. The
agreement was said to “give consumers better access to
a wider range of high quality goods and services at bet-
ter prices” (European Commission, May 22, 2014, p. 3).
In November 2014, the Commission implied conciliation
when stating that “the only valid measure of the success
of this negotiation will be whether it improves people’s
lives”; TTIP can do so by addressing “the full range of con-
sumers’ needs” (European Commission, November 18,
2014, pp. 1, 3).
4.2. January 2015–November 2016: Implicit Managed
Globalization
By early 2015, the Commission’s rhetoric was in-
creasingly conciliatory regarding investment protection
(downplaying its risks and emphasizing its necessity in
protecting European business, while agreeing that the
process could be improved). Therewas also positive (e.g.,
TTIP would improve the status quo) and negative (e.g.,
the status quo would be in danger without TTIP) intransi-
gent messaging in response to CSOs’ arguments about
TTIP lowering standards. The same applied when em-
phasizing the geopolitical and economic benefits of TTIP
(Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2019). However, the tenor of
the messaging began to change; functional rhetoric be-
came more prevalent as the Commission attempted to
lessen the polarization over TTIP.
Attempts at addressing fears of TTIP now included
using opponents’ language and positions to stress the
overriding importance of defending European values
and democracy, while simultaneously defending TTIP
(see Garcia-Duran & Eliasson, 2018a). Trade for All, the
Commission’s October 2015 trade policy strategy, ex-
emplifies this effort (European Commission, 2015). The
strategy was heralded as evidence that the Commission
was addressing people’s concerns by redesigning the
EU’s trade policy strategy:
We have learned from the TTIP debate. On the one
hand, we have learned that people do want more
trade….But on the other hand, we have learned that
they don’t want to compromise on the core principles
of European society in order to get those benefits….In
our new approach, trade is not just about our eco-
nomic interests but also about our values….Actively
managing change is therefore essential to making
sure the benefits of globalisation are fairly distributed
and negative impacts are mitigated. The social con-
sequences of market opening must be addressed.
(European Commission, October 19, pp. 5-6, 11)
The Commission stressed that the EU can export its
values and shape globalization through its trade agree-
ments, using access to its market as a recognized bar-
gaining chip to obtain changes in the domestic arena of
its trading partners (European Commission, October 10,
2015, p. 1, November 9, 2016, p. 2). The Commission ex-
plained that “we should use it to promote European val-
ues like sustainable development, human rights, fair and
ethical trade and the fight against corruption” (European
Commission, 2015, p. 6, cf. February 25, 2016 and
March 15, 2016). The new trade strategy was based on
three core principles: effectiveness, transparency, and
values, which address the “widespread concern that
trade policy is more about the large companies and the
investors than about individual European citizens….[It is]
a trade policy which is in tune with European values”
(European Commission, November 30, 2015, pp. 4–5).
This aligned with the core of MG. The Commission rec-
ognized that people “need reassurance that we will
not use trade agreements to put economic advantage
above our other goals, like consumer and environmen-
tal protection or the rights of workers,” while promot-
ing “the kind of trade agenda that can both find legiti-
macy among EU citizens and deliver economic results”
(European Commission, September 22, 2016, pp. 2, 4).
Within this framework, the Commission applied the
concept of a “progressive trade agreement,” hailing
CETA as its standard bearer—the term was initially used
in 2015 by the Obama administration to describe the
Transpacific Partnership Agreement, and then in August
2016 by Sigmar Gabriel, Vice Chancellor of Germany, re-
ferring to CETA. CETA was said to be a progressive trade
agreement that guarantees transparency (“negotiators
in close contact with civil society and closely watched
over by Member States and the European Parliament”)
and the protection of public services (“There is no obli-
gation to privatize anything. And no block on renational-
izing an already privatized service”); the right regulatory
cooperation (“enshrines our right to regulate in the pub-
lic interest. And, while it encourages regulatory authori-
ties to cooperate, it does not oblige them to do so”), and
investment protection (“much-needed reform of inter-
national investment protection agreements”) (European
Commission, September 20, 2016, p. 4). The Commission
argued that CETA would allow the EU to benefit from
trade and investments, while prioritizing and exporting
high EU standards, and agreeing to rules that tame un-
bridled competition (and which could set standards for
other agreements).
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4.3. November 2016–September 2017: Explicit
Managed Globalization
By balancing free trade with defending values, the lan-
guage used since 2015 fits the MG doctrine. However,
it was only after TTIP negotiations paused in November
2016 that the Commission moved from ‘progressive
trade agreements’ to ‘managed globalization.’ This was
concurrent with a shift in both the source (more par-
ties and labor unions) and focus (away from trade agree-
ments to trade and globalization generally) of contesta-
tion, as anti-TTIP and anti-CETA protests waned, but did
not vanish; anti-CETA protests continued in Brussels dur-
ing the agreement’s 2017 ratification process.
Explicit reference to MG first reappears in a speech
on November 9th, tellingly titled “Shaping Globalisation
through EU Trade Policy,” where the Commissioner ar-
gues that “shaping globalisation is also about ensuring
that people in Europe feel they have influence over
the global rules that are affecting them” (European
Commission, November 9, 2016, p. 1). The first ref-
erence to populism appeared two months prior, and
by late November the Commission acknowledged that
the political realities of the time included both people
who perceived themselves economically disadvantaged
by globalization (and fed the anti-trade populist and
nationalist movements), and people who were skepti-
cal about a number of trade agreements and negotia-
tions because they saw them as endangering European
values (European Commission, November 29, 2016). In
subsequent speeches, references to protectionist de-
mands by populists complemented or substituted for
CSOs’ demands of preserving European values. The
Commission’s answer came through functional rhetoric
referencing MG.
The Commission thus shifted the emphasis of its
discourse from primarily value preservation to dealing
with globalization, arguing that trade openness com-
ports with EU interests and ideas, “trade must be seen
to deliver. By using trade policy as a vehicle for our val-
ues, we can shape globalization, rather than merely sub-
mitting to it, or letting others shape it for us” (European
Commission, January 24, 2017, p. 4). The emphasis
was also on the need for an open, progressive, trad-
ing system, without compromising standards or values,
“while shaping globalization” (European Commission,
March 28, 2017, p. 1, 4). The Commission’s September
2017 progress report on Trade for All emphasizes how
the 2015 strategy should continue guiding the EU’s ap-
proach to making “globalization work for all Europeans”
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). The report explains
how the EU is using all available tools to implement
its trade strategy and enforce its commitments, while
“shaping globalization into an opportunity” (European
Commission, 2017a, p. 4). In an accompanying commu-
nication the Commission also proposes new initiatives
to proactively shape and manage global trade “to en-
sure it is fair, projects values and remains firmly an-
chored in a rules-based system” (European Commission,
2017b, p. 2).
5. The Commission’s Approach and Its Fit with
Managed Globalization
In this section we assess how MG, as used by the
Commission since 2015, comports with the five practical
characteristics of the MG doctrine: building a set of con-
straining trading rules, promotingmultilateralism,widen-
ing the definition of trade issues subject to rule-making,
exporting the EU model, and redistributing the bene-
fits and costs of globalization both within the EU and at
the global level. We present the results without distin-
guishing between the periods of implicit and explicit ref-
erences to MG because we find that the Commission’s
rhetoric generally fits these characteristics even before
November 2016. However, through greater acceptance
of bilateralism, as well as a re-enforcement of trade de-
fense measures, we identify a modification of the EU’s
application of the doctrine.
The Commission continuously communicated the
need for redistributing the costs and benefits of global-
ization both within the EU and at the global level. Trade
for All meant “making sure the benefits of trade are
widely spread” by helping fair trade, worker adaptation,
small firms’ provisions, and trade opportunities for EU
developing partners (European Commission, October 19,
2015, p. 6). The Commission came to advocate a re-
vision of the European Globalization Adjustment Fund
(to assist with worker adaptation), longer transition pe-
riods for the most sensitive products, and closer ties
between trade policy and development through the
Economic Partnership Agreements, Everything but Arms,
Aid for Trade, and the General System of Preferences
of the EU (European Commission, November 7, 2015,
February 25, 2016, September 22, 2016, November 9,
2016, January 24, 2017).
The Commission also advocated strong, empow-
ered international institutions with clear rules of the
game and an institutional architecture to monitor those
rules through its support for a rules-based ISDS sys-
tem. While addressing concerns about globalization and
corporate power over governments, the Commission
progressively built an argument that TTIP constituted
an opportunity to modernize investment protection
(European Commission, June 22, 2015, November 17,
2015, January 12, 2016), before deciding to reject a tra-
ditional ISDS in TTIP and instead promoting a new inter-
national court that would be fair, transparent, and ac-
countable (European Commission, September 14, 2016,
January 24, 2017, February 27, 2017; see also European
Commission, 2017a, 2017b; a mandate was also pro-
vided by the European Parliament in 2018), a system
judged compatible with EU by the EU Court of Justice on
April 30, 2019.
The EU used access to its market as a bargain-
ing chip in order to obtain changes in the domestic
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arena of its trading partners: “We are also using the
importance of our economy to shape globalisation”
(European Commission, November 9, 2016, p. 2). The
Commission clearly recognized that the EU can export its
values and shape globalization through its trade agree-
ments (European Commission, October 10, 2015, p. 1).
“We should use it to promote European values like
sustainable development, human rights, fair and ethi-
cal trade and the fight against corruption” (European
Commission, November 30, 2015, p. 6, cf. February 25,
2016, March 15, 2016).
Regarding multilateralism, the Commission ex-
panded the number of issue areas it included when
explaining how its trade policies would best serve EU
citizens. Long a champion of multilateralism, its primacy
appeared to wane with each bilateral agreement pur-
sued by the EU. Bilateralism is now touted as a path-
way (complementing multilateralism) to incrementally
spread EU standards globally (Garcia-Duran & Eliasson,
2018b). The EU trade strategy still involves “working
for progress at the WTO. [But] it also involves a com-
prehensive set of negotiations for bilateral free trade
agreements” (European Commission, June 1, 2015, p. 2,
see also March 23, 2015), and since progress in the
multilateral system “has been too slow…the EU has
put new emphasis on bilateral free trade agreements
with key partners since 2006” (European Commission,
February 25, 2016, p. 4–5). Plurilateral agreements are
also accepted: “If it’s a choice between making progress
with a smaller number of partners or no progress at all,
then we will choose to move forward—plurilaterally”
(European Commission, April 26, 2016, p. 2, also May 2,
2016). The shift towards bilateral and plurilateral agree-
ments is compatible with MG since “bilateral and re-
gional deals like TTIP can support the multilateral system
by acting as policy laboratories of sorts”, and “We are
building a network of agreements all across the world
so that we can link into the world economy and build
truly global value chains that will bring prosperity home”
(European Commission,May 2, 2016, p. 3, September 14,
2016, p. 2).
As a result, bilateral (and plurilateral) agreements
play a role in another of the MG characteristics, namely
expanding the number of issues subject to rule-making
in trade agreements. Immediately following the publi-
cation of Trade for All, the Commission promised to
include “anti-corruption provisions in EU trade agree-
ments,” while also addressing services, digital trade, mo-
bility, and labor rights (such as collective bargaining), and
protecting endangered species (European Commission,
October 19, 2015, p. 7, November 30, 2015, p. 4,
March 15, 2016). One year later the Commission de-
clared that “All new trade deals include chapters on trade
and sustainable development, including labor rights and
the environment” (European Commission, March 22,
2017, p. 2, cf. on November 9, 2016, and January 24,
2017). Table 2 summarizes our argument over how MG
as applied from 2015 to 2017 related to its 1999 version.
Finally, another difference in the EU’s explicit refer-
ences to MG was the emphasis on trade defense instru-
ments, which were strengthened in order to respond to
unfair competition, while the Commission argued that
more should be done to help workers adapt (European
Commission, November 29, 2016, pp. 3–4, see also
January 24, 2017, May 9 and 23, 2017, and European
Commission, 2017a). In 2016 the Commission referred to
a crisis in the steel industry provoked by excess Chinese
capacity, and how in China “too often the state is more
a participant than an independent regulator” (European
Commission, March 10, 2016, p. 3). As one example of
the staying power of this expansion to MG, European
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker explained in
2018 that “the EU believes in open and fair trade but we
are not naïve free traders.” “Make nomistake,” he added,
“wewill do whatever it takes to defend European produc-
ers and workers when others distort the market or don’t
play by the rules” (European Commission, 2018).
6. Concluding Discussion
Our analysis of the European Commission’s rhetoric
regarding TTIP, CETA, and EU trade policy in general,
from 2013 to 2017, indicates that the Commission re-
sponse to trade politicization in 2015–2017 was part of
a rhetorical counter-strategy, and that it was grounded
in the MG doctrine. We identify three distinct peri-
ods in the Commission’s rhetoric: from 2013 through
2014, early 2015 through mid-2016, and mid-2016 to
Table 2.MG doctrine characteristics.
MG doctrine characteristics EU’s application 2015–2017
Redistributing the benefits and costs of globalization both within Present
the EU and at the global level
Building a set of constraining trading rules Present
Exporting the EU model Present
Promoting multilateralism Through bilateralism and plurilateralism
Widening the definition of trade issues subject to rule-making Present
Not present Re-enforcement of trade defense measures
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(at least) September 2017. During the first period, the
Commission was predominantly defending its trade pol-
icy and negotiations with the US on the basis of eco-
nomic benefits—using predominantly intransigent mes-
saging (TTIP would improve the status quo, and with-
out TTIP the status quo would be in danger). In 2015–
2016, the second period, the Commission responded to
intensifying claims by CSOs that EU standards and val-
ues were in danger. Elements of the MG doctrine were
used to lessen polarization, but without touting the doc-
trine. During this period there was also a shift in the
messaging, from mainly intransigent to more functional
(European values cannot be endangered). The third pe-
riod entailed a reframed rhetoric directed primarily at
populist arguments and demands for protectionism; the
Commission’s language was framed in explicit MG lan-
guage, with emphasis on how trade serves European cit-
izens, and globalization can be controlled (i.e., no need
for protectionism). This reframed rhetoric was communi-
cated mainly through functional messaging (using oppo-
nents’ language and standpoints).
These results add to our understanding of the im-
pact of politicization on trade policy, by showing how
the Commission’s rhetoric changed in response to mo-
bilization. It therefore appears the Commission is seek-
ing legitimation through ideas, that is, trying “to per-
suade citizens or other EU institutional actors of the
EU’s political responsiveness to citizens needs and de-
mands” (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2018, p. 761). Not only
did trade politicization over TTIP elicit an expansive re-
sponse from the Commission, but that response largely
conformed to the MG doctrine as defined in section
three. Nevertheless, the MG doctrine has been adapted
to respond to the changing sources and focus of con-
testation during and after TTIP negotiations. While the
shift from multilateralism to bilateralism and plurilater-
alism, and the new importance of trade defense mea-
sures could be interpreted by someas a shift towards pro-
tectionism, our assessment is quite different. The EU’s
contemporary and expanded application of the MG doc-
trine includes a recognition that a multilateral approach
is not the primary means by which to manage globaliza-
tion. Instead, bilateral and plurilateral agreements are
pursued as stepping-stones to global, multilateral, rules
and standards. Furthermore, 21st century geopolitical
and economic shifts, and the protests they have birthed,
have made strengthening and enforcing defensive trade
measures a necessary part of rule-making.
Using the MG doctrine as a metric against which to
assess the evolution of the Commission’s approach to
trade policy may thus be useful. When comparing EU
trade strategies in 2010 and 2015–2017, Young (2019)
concludes that there is more continuity than change.
While we agree that the Commission’s trade strategies
and policies have always reflected certain values, there
is a clear change in the rhetorical strategy pursued by
the Commission. The adoption of the MG doctrine sig-
nals a willingness to re-balance the equilibrium between
openness (market access) and rules, where the defense
of certain values (principles) is now as prominent as mar-
ket access.
The fact that explicit references to MG emerged just
as the TTIP negotiations were frozen, and they persisted
one year later, indicate that the Commission deemed it
useful as a way of signaling a permanent shift its trade
policy. Thus, by late 2017 a modified and expanded MG
had become the EU’s leitmotif on trade; only future re-
search covering periods of less contentious trade nego-
tiations can assess whether MG endures. What we have
shown in this article is that politicization of trade affected
the Commission’s reaction, response, and messaging on
trade, and ultimately its trade doctrine (guiding trade pol-
icy and strategy).
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